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This text1 is written as a collective discussion pa-
per by the research group Progress and its Discon-
tents – Ideas, Practices, Materiality2, and seeks to 
develop the notion of contingency in the historical 
and ethnographic study of progress. We broadly 
understand progress as a horizon of possibilities, 
a temporal blank screen upon which visions of re-
ality can be projected by given actors. Progress 
can, potentially, be brought about through a set of 
transformative actions, which might either serve 
to alter or maintain the status quo. Building on 
African and Asian case studies of the 20th and 
21st centuries, we will focus on the interstitial and 
interdependent nature of progress and possible 
imagined futures: that is to say, the anticipation 
and desire of a certain future and the possibility 
of its actualisation. It is this temporal dimension 
of progress that embeds the future in the present 
and makes it a valuable research topic for unravel-
ling the underlying tendencies in the science, pol-
icy and desires of a given society or social circle.3 
As progress opens up particular social concepts 
and practices to possibility or possible scenarios, 
a certain aware ness of the inability to control the 
route to the future tends to emerge and inform the 
narratives of progress. In other words, in our case 
studies, progress as an idea and a project of social 
transformation is partially grounded in actors’ 
1 »The Possibilities are Endless« is the title of a documen-
tary by James Hall and Edward Lovelace, http://www.imdb.
com/title/tt3512066/ (accessed 26 February 2015).
2  The research group consists of five projects – historical 
and anthropological – which are described in detail under 
http://www.zmo.de/forschung/index_e.html (accessed 26 Fe-
bruary 2015).
3 This point was eloquently stressed by Ernst Bloch, 1976, 
Das Prinzip Hoffnung, 3 vols, (3rd ed.), Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, see esp. Vol. I, 6, 12. 
recognition that things could be/come otherwise. 
This recognition is then articulated as a specific 
modus to apprehend, limit, navigate or exploit the 
horizon of wayward, possible scenarios envisioned 
at a given place and time. By the term contingency, 
we therefore aim to capture an awareness by actors 
of the indeterminate nature of social life, or more 
specifically, a reflective mode vis-à-vis indetermi-
nacy in the formulation of progress-related ideas 
and agendas, as well as their related practices of 
implementation. Although contingency is a basic 
fact of daily life, we would argue that there are 
moments of heightened awareness of contingency 
that emerge from actual or felt transitions within 
or concerning a given society. One could say that 
expected or witnessed changes give rise to a more 
acute feeling of contingency and the will to master 
the future in some wayy. 
In recent years, contingency has become an 
important analytical category for the study of 
progress, and in particular for the study of mo-
dernity. It has been noted that progress and 
development(alism) lie at the heart of modernity.4 
Ideas about Progress (with a capital P) typically 
envisage a certain linearity and orderliness of 
temporality and social change, at least in West-
ern thought since the advent of Enlightenment. 
A paradigmatic example from the 20th century is 
the modernist notion of progress, encapsulated 
in modernisation theory, as a linear development 
with a given content and goal (most commonly 
economic and technological advancement). Since 
then, historical and social analyses have gone a 
long way in distancing themselves from the evolu-
4 Arif Dirlik, »Modernity as History: Post-revolutionary 
China, Globalization and the Question of Modernity«, Social 
History, 27:1 (2002) 16-39.
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tionary and teleological narrative of Progress, and 
instead describe Progress and modernity as multi- 
faceted historical formations that arose out of a 
series of contingent events and circumstances, 
which could have yielded different outcomes and 
created alternative courses of history.5 
In this paper, we adopt the term contingency 
to pursue a somewhat different line of inquiry. 
Our research views contingency as an analytical 
tool to shift attention away from deterministic 
understandings of progress. As noted, we under-
stand progress (with a small p) in more general 
terms and study it primarily in non-European set-
tings. More importantly, we are less interested in 
identi fying contingent events in given historical 
or civilisational trajectories than in highlighting 
the ways in which contingency is understood and 
then articulated through diverse ideas, practices 
and sentiments that ultimately inform progress-
related projects. Thus, although certain narratives 
of progress described in this paper may actually 
hinge on order and a supposed telos, our case stud-
ies will show how notions and perceptions of con-
tingency contributed to delineating the space in 
which they emerged and became appealing to the 
actors involved.
Albeit at a preliminary stage of research, our 
projects have so far identified a variety of under-
standings of contingency in different epochs, places 
and social settings. The contingent may appear as 
an (or sometimes the) intractable element of dis-
turbance or insecurity whose elimination is vital 
for the pursuit of progress. Two of the case studies 
concern the period following World War II. At that 
time, people all over the globe realised that the 
world was about to change; they were, however, 
very unsure about the direction this would take. 
In the Ethiopian case studied by Bromber, the re-
cent, unprecedented experience of occupation by 
a foreign power (i.e. Fascist Italy in 1935-41) ex-
acerbated anxieties among the country’s political 
elites about Ethiopia’s position and sovereignty 
in a new polarised world order. Preoccupations 
about internal struggles for power further added 
to external insecurity. As Bromber shows, these 
scenarios informed the subsequent policies for 
a »New Ethiopia« and a »New Man« in profound 
ways. They were attempts by the imperial author-
ity to gain firm control over the country and the 
course of history. Emphasis on mastery and self-
mastery also emerge from Roy’s case study about 
South Asian youth and student movements. Uncer-
tainties continued during the Cold War era, when 
fears not only of another impending worldwide 
conflict, but also of nuclear war, were coupled, at 
the national level, with the need for nation-build-
5 See especially Wolfgang Knöbl, Die Kontingenz der 
Moderne: Wege in Europa, Asien und Amerika, Frankfurt am 
Main 2007.
ing and youth (de-)mobilisation after colonisation. 
It is against this backdrop of crisis that the trans-
national activities of non-governmental actors in 
this period should be seen and is here studied 
through the lens of South Asian youth and student 
movements that are active at home and on interna-
tional platforms during this period. 
The grand ideologies and projects characteris-
tic of the 20th Century have often generated unex-
pected outcomes and new contingencies. The three 
remaining African case studies address precisely 
some of the challenges people face after the end of 
the Cold War, and the related demise of post-colo-
nial promises and widespread socio-economic vul-
nerability engendered by neoliberal globalisation. 
Tadesse’s study of entrepreneurship programmes 
in Ethiopia shows that the Ethiopian state once 
again seeks to create confident visions of econom-
ic progress by engineering new national subjects. 
Through the discursive and practical promotion 
of »entrepreneurship«, a largely structural prob-
lem – unemployment – is framed as an attitudinal 
problem. The »mind-shift« required of programme 
participants does not simply serve to eliminate 
economic insecurity, but also to devise a manage-
rial approach to such economic contingency, in the 
sense of being able to navigate market volatility 
so as to produce jobs and growth in Ethiopia. In a 
similar vein, Gaibazzi shows that contingency may 
serve to sustain, rather than hinder, models of per-
sonal and societal success. Among the Gambian 
Soninke men with whom he conducted research, 
prospects of a better future life and community 
are essentially linked to wealth accumulation in 
transnational migrant circuits of labour and trade. 
The cosmological notions of »luck« and fate are 
here relied upon not only to make sense of the va-
garies of migrant livelihoods, but also to promote 
an ethos of adaptability and entrepreneurship. In a 
different West African context, religion and religi-
osity provide an even more central platform and 
idiom for the imagination of the future, setting it 
wide open and filled with unpredictable outcomes. 
Sounaye’s project examines how young Salafi 
(Sunnance) in Niamey, Niger, take on the mission 
to redefine the moral and the material conditions 
of their lives, rejecting secular modernity as the 
condition of progress. Sunnance embrace moral 
activism and religious entrepreneurship aimed at 
providing them with an orderly life today, and an 
adequate preparation for tomorrow, thereby shift-
ing agency for guaranteeing stability away from 
the state and privatising it within a moral econo-
my geared towards a metaphysical stability, in an 
otherwise highly contingent and insecure environ-
ment. 
A common focus of the case studies, beyond Pro-
gress and the contingent, is youth (especially young 
male actors) and the moral or physical self-reform 
proscribed for these actors. Youth emerges as a 
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central focus of state-sponsored developmental or, 
in the 21st century, typically in the form of social 
engineering projects with diverse origins beyond 
the confines of the state. Youth functions as a pro-
jection surface for visions of the future, as well as 
the most natural object and subject when it comes 
to implementing change thanks to it acting as a 
somatic bridge between present and future.6 
Whether the contingent figures as an ally 
of progress or as the symptom or generator of 
its discontents, we have found that attempts to 
tame contingency are invariably at the core of 
progress-related dynamics. Before detailing the 
case studies, we, therefore, identify categories 
and conceptual gateways which allow for a fruit-
ful communication and comparative analysis of 
contingency (more specifically, actors’ awareness 
of contingency). Rather than conclusive answers, 
however, this paper delineates a terrain of inquiry 
and its epistemological underpinnings, hoping to 
invite further discussion.
Experience, expectation and the contingent: 
analytical premises
In philosophical usage, the contingent is defined 
as »what could be other because it has no nec-
essary ground of existence«,7 or »that which did 
not have to happen«.8 It is in other words an el-
ement of indeterminacy that defies deterministic 
views of reality. In referring to contingency, how-
ever, we are less interested in philosophical takes 
on determinacy and occurrence than in subject-
ing to empirical inquiry what given social actors 
make of the open-endedness of their social exist-
ence. Crucially, whereas the contingent is gener-
ally understood as (ahistorical) randomness in a 
stochastic sense, in social and historical analysis 
it mainly captures, as we purport to show in this 
section, sources of indeterminacy located in social 
life, and hence, in relations, institutions, practices, 
imagination and affect.9 We use contingency as 
a term to describe a particular social reflexiv-
ity, in which culturally specific representations, 
orientations and activities have as their point of 
reference a certain indeterminateness of reality. 
We feel that »contingency« is particularly suited 
as a conceptual category for analysing and com-
paring our research materials because it provides 
us with an etic, umbrella-like term to discuss a 
wide spectrum of such socio-cultural concepts and 
6 The intrinsic link between youth and modernity has been 
a matter of scholarly studies, but we will not go into details 
concerning that aspect in the present paper.
7 Michael Makropoulos, »Crisis and Contingency Two Cate-
gories of the Discourse of Classical Modernity«, Thesis Ele-
ven, 111:1 (2012),  12.
8 Thomas M. Malaby, »Our Present Misfortune: Games 
and the Post-Bureaucratic Colonization of Contingency«, 
Social Analysis, 56:2 (2012), 104.
9 Ibid.
practices. Related terms in use in social analysis 
such as uncertainty, chance, risk, etc., seem to us 
less inclusive and more culturally biased in this 
respect. They often presuppose indeterminacy to 
be a negative or undesirable element, as indeed 
revealed by Euro-modernist notions of progress as 
order and telos. Contingency, by contrast, allows 
us a more neutral idiom for considering such emic 
categories that point to the open-ended quality of 
social existence and, in particular, of progress-
related projects, while also making room for other 
visions and attitudes. We use it as a concept that 
takes a step back from contemporaneous notions of 
progress so as to better understand the specifici-
ties of different projects that have sought to bring 
about a desired future. This approach allows, too, 
for an archaeology of progress-related projects: a 
view that treats those attempts to shape the future 
that were short-lived or ultimately unsuccessful on 
a par with those that were vindicated by history.10 
This then avoids the temptation of »reading his-
tory backwards«.11
In the first place, the emergence of possibility 
and indeterminacy as salient elements of progress-
related projects must be studied as a historical de-
velopment. Put differently, the fact that societies 
place emphasis on futures and wayward possibili-
ties, and consequently grapple with indeterminacy, 
should not be taken for granted, but requires his-
torical contextualisation. The awareness of inde-
terminacy appears to especially characterise peri-
ods of dramatic or relatively sudden change in one 
way or the other. Witnessing accelerated change 
and thereby the inherent openness of the future 
seems to give rise to more fundamental ways of 
grappling with the future in the form of ideolo-
gies, revised forms of social semantics and sociali-
sation. This can be noted in specific epochal his-
torical shifts. As historian Reinhart Koselleck has 
pointed out, the rise of modernity (in Europe) was 
marked by a far-reaching engagement with the fu-
ture, and more specifically with possible futures. 
Starting from the late 18th century, concerns and 
efforts were no longer solely directed at reproduc-
ing the status quo, thus shaping the future in the 
guise of the past; the future was, as it were, liber-
ated and opened up to new possibilities, thereby 
compelling social actors to formulate and confront 
future scenarios, which in turn led to an accelera-
tion of social change. To analyse this process, Ko-
selleck employed two formal, abstract categories 
– experience and expectation – that interrelate 
past, present, and future, and frame human action 
10 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge [transl. 
by AM Sheridan Smith], London (1st ed. 1972), 1995.
11 Especially see Frederick Cooper’s remarks on »Histo-
ry and Political Imagination« in »Africa’s Pasts and Africa’s 
Historians«, Canadian Journal of African Studies, 34:2 
(2000), 312.
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with respect to time.12 He insisted that experience 
and expectation are not binaries, but an interde-
pendent couple: the two together simultaneously 
constitute history as well as peoples’ cognition of 
history. He argued further that »experience is pre-
sent past, whose events can be incorporated and 
can be remembered« through a process of perma-
nent reworking of individual and »alien« experi-
ences.13 Assuming the past as total – as diverse 
interpenetrating and overlapping layers of time 
– the author speaks of the »space of experience« 
(Erfahrungsraum). »Expectation« – both individual 
and interpersonal – is »future made present«.14 Ex-
pectation is directed at the non- experienced, but 
confronts a limit, which Koselleck called the »ho-
rizon of expectation« (Erwartungs horizont). This 
incorporates hopes, fears, rational predictions, 
speculations, etc.15
In the modern period, while experience and ex-
pectation remain linked, they are growing pro-
gressively apart from each other due to the rapid 
transformations that take place. The horizon of 
expectation is distanced from the space of experi-
ence, in the sense that the future is not a projec-
tion of the past, but a constellation of possibilities 
largely not previously experienced. Interestingly, 
in this period, ideas of progress, with their under-
lying doctrine of perfection, endowed the horizon 
of expectation »with a coefficient of change that 
advances in step with time«.16 These ideas did not 
only anticipate the future as being different. They 
projected the future as being created by human 
agents. 
Whereas Koselleck’s approach provides the ana-
lytical ground for an investigation of progress in 
terms of experience and expectation, his treat-
ment of contingency remains cursory. One may 
nevertheless observe that the disjuncture between 
experience and expectation at the foundation of 
(European) modernity posits the future as a pos-
sibility – as such, the future can »always be other« 
and cannot be predicted. Indeed, as philosopher 
Michael Makropoulos has shown, the rupture be-
tween experience and expectation may not solely 
give rise to an over-proliferation of possibilities 
and the inability to know what to expect of the 
future. But, he argues, in the Weimar Republic 
(1920s), contingency was experienced in such a 
fundamental way that it shattered all notions of 
relative certainty or reasonable expectations.17 
12 According to Koselleck they are formal because »what 
is experienced and what is expected at any one time cannot 
be deduced from the categories themselves.« Reinhart Ko-
selleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, 
New York, 2004, 256.
13 Koselleck, Futures Past, 259, emphasis added. 
14 Ibid., emphasis added.
15 Ibid.
16 Koselleck, Futures Past, 266.
17 Makropoulos, »Crises and Contingency«, 9-18.
The catastrophic dissolution of the (bourgeois) 
world view caused by World War I had rendered 
the impossible possible. Reality itself came to be 
perceived as contingent, thus making past experi-
ence and models irrelevant for designing or pre-
dicting the future. At the same time, with reality 
being seen as intrinsically malleable to human 
agency; there was ample room for ideas of total (or 
even totalitarian) change and a society dreamt up 
at the drawing board. The uneasiness at the per-
ceived openness of the future to uncontrollable, 
cataclysmic scenarios also nurtured longings for 
order, often combined with a demand for a prelimi-
nary tabula rasa – sentiments which informed in 
complex ways the following period of totalitarian 
rule in Germany. 
An important point here is that indeterminacy is 
an inherent element of the social, political and eco-
nomic fabric of given historical contexts, or even 
of their cosmological order as a whole.18 Similar 
to Bloch,19 Alasdair MacIntyre views contingency 
as a permanent element of human life, something 
which originates both from within the self and 
from social interaction.20 This poses a challenge to 
any deterministic understanding of social reality, 
which have so far prevailed in the historical and 
social sciences, and invites further investigation 
of the role of indeterminacy in shaping not only 
institutions and systems of thought, but also mun-
dane practices and habits. Operationalising Mac-
Intyre’s insights,21 anthropologist Thomas Malaby 
has proposed analysing indeterminacy on an on-
tological level as part of the »chanceful quality of 
experience«. He points to various ways of under-
standing the relationships between (one’s own) ac-
tion and experience or outcomes. These different 
attitudes are: 
… the product of the always moving meeting 
point between open-ended experience oriented 
toward the future and the irretrievable past. 
And they entail both the project of meaning ma-
king in the wake of the unexpected as well as 
practical dispositions that shape engagements 
in the fraught moments of indeterminacy them-
selves.22 
Albeit in a different fashion to Koselleck and Mak-
ropoulos, Malaby also stresses that contingency 
emerges between future-oriented experience (or 
expectation) and past experience. However, he 
additionally locates the contingent in daily life 
18  Thomas M. Malaby, Gambling Life: Dealing in Contin-
gency in a Greek City, Champaign, 2003, 16.
19 Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung.
20 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral The-
ory (3rd ed.), Notre Dame, 2007, 93-105.
21 Malaby, Gambling Life, 14-6.
22 Malaby, »Our Present Misfortune«, 104.
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and social interaction, and focuses attention not 
only on visions and ideas, but also on the signi-
fying practices and the practical dispositions that 
engage with it.23 Therefore, another strength of 
using contingency as a concept lies in its leading 
away from any simplistic re-narration of a mod-
ernisation (or post-modernisation) drama in which 
a supposed loss of security, certainty and social 
alienation necessarily lead to romanticist nostal-
gia, nationalism and a yearning for order. Instead, 
contingency highlights the multiplicity of possible 
practices and attitudes – as well as the possible 
coeval existence of such attitudes – towards the 
open-endedness of the world. It steers research 
towards asking questions of why and how certain 
attitudes emerge, which also makes this frame-
work particularly amenable to a comparative 
analysis of all those socio-cultural and economic 
factors that shape evolving dispositions towards 
contingency, including manipulation by politicians 
or elites, governmentality, popular cultural beliefs 
and practices.
In sum, employing contingency as an analytical 
tool appears to make room for the formulation of 
relevant research questions in relation to projects 
of progress on at least three, interrelated levels. 
Firstly, we need to understand the historical and 
epistemic shifts in which possibilities and possi-
ble futures emerge at the (dis)juncture between 
experience and expectation, past and future. And 
hence: under what historical conditions does the 
awareness of contingency emerge as a significant 
element of progress, and in which forms? Second-
ly, we are interested in understanding how given 
societal contexts understand and deal with contin-
gency, how they frame it as an element of social 
projects of progress. In this respect, we pay atten-
tion to the specific institutional context in which 
discourses of the contingent are generated and 
circulated in relation to future possibilities and 
trajectories. This often relates to practices of the 
state, especially in the 20th century but can also 
refer to social networks, a focus more prevalent 
in the post-modern and post-industrial age as can 
be seen from the case studies already. Thirdly, we 
are interested in the ways in which these predica-
ments of the contingent shape and are shaped by 
dispositions and habits through which indetermi-
nacy is engaged in everyday social praxis.24 
23 See also: Elizabeth Cooper and David Pratten, »Eth-
nography of Uncertainty in Africa: An Introduction«, in 
Elizabeth Cooper and David Pratten (eds.), Ethnography of 
Uncertainty in Africa, New York, 2015, 1-2.
24 Koselleck, Futures Past, 262. Koselleck elaborates on 
this point with regard to prognosis which is derived from ex-
perience and discloses expectations including hopes, fears, 
etc.
Taming Contingency: Between Mastery and 
Embracement
The following case studies illustrate how contin-
gency may be productively investigated at one or 
more levels of analysis, and in particular show 
ways in which contingency is tamed in the pursuit 
of progress. We use the term »taming« because, 
as we purport to show, ideas and practices of pro-
gress do not simply acknowledge contingency, but 
actively grapple with it – albeit without neces-
sarily subduing it.25 Taming contingency may be 
attempted by constructing meanings and notions, 
prescribing specific responses and attitudes, de-
vising practices and relationships, and entrusting 
to specific actors the responsibility of coming to 
terms with it.
Our case studies are situated in different his-
torical, geographical, and socio-cultural contexts. 
These include East Africa and South Asia in the in-
terwar and post-World War II period (Roy, Bromber) 
and West and East Africa in the post-Cold War and 
neoliberal period (Gaibazzi, Sounaye, Tadesse). 
Thus, the case studies deal with the aftermath of 
the three major global confrontations – eras which 
are particularly prone to intense and urgent at-
tempts to come to terms with uncertainty and pos-
sibility – and seen through the lens of the (post)
colonial »periphery«. These are then not only eras, 
but also areas that lend themselves well to inves-
tigations of the reformulation of and discontent 
with post-Enlightenment notions of progress and 
(post-)Cold War understandings of development. 
While we seek to highlight the diverse modalities 
for taming contingency, in what follows we still 
proceed in a chronological order for we feel that 
the historical specificities, as well as continuities 
and discontinuities, of such practices should be 
clearly outlined. 
One way of taming contingency is to attempt to 
eliminate it altogether. The period of the late 19th 
and 20th century provides striking examples of 
such an approach to contingency. At that time, the 
desire to master contingency became embodied in 
a belief in scientific inquiry that, if applied to so-
cieties or civilisations, should be able to unravel 
the laws of social and human progress.26 The era is 
also marked by what Foucault described as think-
ing from the apocalypse, i.e. history being viewed 
from some »logical« end point to which it was in-
25 The term is inspired by the work of Ian Hacking, The 
Taming of Chance, which shows that modern history was not 
only characterised by an opening toward possible futures, 
but also by a domestication of chance by employing statis-
tics and probability as techniques of governmentality and 
the definition of norms. Ian Hacking, The Taming of Chance. 
Cambridge, 1990.
26 Michael Bentley, 2013, »The Turn Towards ›Science‹: 
Historians Delivering Untheorized Truth« in Nancy Parker/
Sarah Foot (eds.), The Sage Handbook of Historical Theory, 
London, 10-22.
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exorably steering.27 As noted above, nowhere is 
this more evident than in the totalising tendencies 
that informed narratives of progress and utopian 
political projects during the interwar period. As 
Makropoulos shows, the concern with restoring 
order, certainty and directionality is part and par-
cel of the modernist project, and could be detected 
in the writings of different political thinkers, rang-
ing from the radical left to the far right.28 
Albeit in different ways, totalising tendencies 
continued to inform projects of sociopolitical pro-
gress well after World War II. In this period, inde-
terminacy and uncertainty vis-à-vis future scenar-
ios was perhaps most palpable in the spectre of an 
impending world conflict and of nuclear annihila-
tion during the Cold War period. At the same time, 
and partly because of these factors, this was a 
period of self-confident mastery over contingency, 
most evident in grand narratives of supreme ideo-
logical struggles and the values they represented. 
The future was projected as being better and made 
by men29 (and their technical innovations). Irre-
spective of the quality or mode of the advancement 
– gradual or revolutionary (or impossible) – these 
tendencies served and still serve to legitimate po-
litical projects. Katrin Bromber’s study on body 
politics in Ethiopia in the first, but especially in the 
second half of the twentieth century is a good case 
in point. Until 1935, the country had proudly man-
aged to keep its independence and was a symbol in 
Africa for freedom from colonialism. Hesitation by 
the League of Nations, of which Ethiopia had been 
a member, in the face of Italian aggression was 
a deep disappointment for Emperor Hayle Sillasé. 
Since he had fled Ethiopia during the war and was 
later able to return only with the help of British 
Imperial Forces, the emperor was no longer sure 
he would be able to rule. Intellectuals, as well as 
Hayle Sillasé himself, were aware of the country’s 
backwardness. Thus, the proclamation of a »New 
Era« in Ethiopian history 1941, reminiscent of tab-
ula rasa attempts elsewhere, meant to strengthen 
the Emperor’s rule against external and internal 
threats, as well as achieve social development and 
economic progress in order to become an equal 
player in the international arena.
 The envisioned future was »New Ethiopia«; a 
strong, internationally recognised, modernised 
quasi-feudal system30 with the Emperor at the 
27 Michel Foucault, »Nietzsche, die Genealogie, die His-
torie«, in idem, Von der Subversion zum Wissen, München, 
1974, 83-109, see esp. 95-96.
28 Makropoulos, »Crisis and Contingency«
29 The conceptualisation of the productive/transformative 
role of men and the re-productive role of women is a matter 
that deserves more attention during this period especially 
as it was also marked by a new wave of emancipation.
30 Whether it was a transformation towards an absolute 
monarchy, though a centralised rather than a feudal one, is 
still a matter of debate.
apex. A developmental framework, which had al-
ready emerged before the occupation by attempts 
to emulate Meiji Imperial Japan, became central to 
this political aim. Centralisation and, thus, »neu-
tralising« his internal enemies was part of Silla-
sé’s tabula rasa modernisation project, which start-
ed immediately after his return from British exile. 
On the external front, he continued his policy of not 
relying on one specific ideological or political strand 
for support, especially when Britain, the United 
States and increasingly the Soviet Union made at-
tempts to re-order the Horn of Africa. Thus, Hayle 
Sillasé worked with a wide range of foreign partners 
and experts, making use of the development aid 
boom after World War II. Arguably, what Frederick 
Cooper31 described as »modernising« colonialism for 
the British and the French Empires in Africa after 
World War II, was not so different from what might 
be called »modernising« imperialism for Ethiopia. In 
order to implement his goals, the emperor needed an 
avant-garde, which had to be transformed from loyal 
subjects into responsible citizens. 
Thus, the progressive young male became the 
primary object of social engineering. The »New 
Man« of Ethiopia had to be a good soldier, politically 
interested, responsible with regards to the nation 
and open to Africa and the world. Hence, progress 
in Bromber’s project focusses on the aspect of de-
velopment through the disciplining of human bod-
ies in order to serve a hegemonic, imperial project. 
In the educational sector, expatriates from various 
countries worked in schools and training institu-
tions of the armed forces, in betterment homes, 
in volunteer organisations like the Young Men’s 
Christian Association (YMCA) or the Boy Scouts, 
but also in ministries and other regulating bod-
ies. Striving for bodily »advancement« through a 
state-monitored body-cult developed, on the one 
hand, into a mentality of normative fitness mani-
festing itself in all socio-cultural spheres (includ-
ing popular culture) and, on the other, into a grow-
ing militarisation of Ethiopian society. Sport and 
defence, be it against human weakness or external 
and internal enemies, merged into a discourse of 
the fit soldier or athlete as a fighting machine. 
The available documents, such as newspapers, 
journals and archival materials allow for the study 
an official discourse. But this discourse only part-
ly reveals the »athletic turn« in the 1960s. For 
the radical Ethiopian students of the 1960s, the 
soldier-like bodily fitness became a prerequisite 
for fighting imperialism in general and Ethiopian 
imperialism in particular. In contrast to the body 
concepts promoted by popular (imperial) culture, 
their anti-imperialist ideas of bodily »advance-
ment« came very close to the »Socialist New Man« 
31 Frederick Cooper, Out of Empire: Redefining Africa’s 
Place in the World, Göttingen, 2013.
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á la Mao or that of Cuban guerrilla fighters.32 Thus, 
the »unexpected outcome« was that mental and 
bodily »advancement«, plus the growing militarisa-
tion of the society, brought about a radicalisation 
which, in the end, resulted in an opposing tabula 
rasa approach, sweeping away the empire and opt-
ing for socialism as a radical alternative. Only a few 
people, if any, could have anticipated such an out-
come in 1941 when the emperor had proclaimed 
the »New Era« for Ethiopia.
The turn from imperialist centralisation to social-
ism has, of course, been seen in the context of the 
Cold War that, on the surface, divided the world 
neatly into a Western and an Eastern Bloc plus 
its satellites. The period introduced a new kind of 
contingency awareness, for during the Cold War, 
it was not a specific nation or state whose survival 
was at stake but the future of mankind itself. At 
the Bandung Conference of 1955, Nehru argued 
that any aggression at the present would lead to a 
global conflagration and nuclear annihilation. He 
then declared all pre-nuclear experience and old 
maxims of action, which present leaders still clung 
to, to be utterly useless now.33 It was at Bandung 
that the philosophy of non-alignment was first es-
poused, yet non-alignment, too, grew out of inter-
war anti-colonial networks and retained some of 
those structures and spirit. The cold-war world 
was, after all, still in a process of decolonisation 
that required careful manoeuvring. Both blocs, in 
turn, came to see the »Third World« as critical are-
as whose eventual allegiance might tip the balance 
in favour of one side or the other. Franziska Roy’s 
study traces various youth groups whose role in 
society had been similar to that outlined above by 
Bromber: the nationalist movement had portray-
ed them as civilian soldiers and torchbearers of 
progress.34 In the aftermath of the bloody parti-
tion of British-India, student and youth groups had 
to be demobilised by the new states of India and 
Pakistan and their energy channelled into nation-
building instead. During the Cold-War period, such 
groups also acted at times as unofficial »cultural 
attachés«. South Asian youth and student groups 
participated in various international platforms, 
some of which were communist fronts (like the 
World Federation of Democratic Youth, or the In-
32 Katrin Bromber, »›Muscular Christianity‹: The Role of 
the Ethiopian YMCA Sports in Shaping ›Modern‹ Masculini-
ties (1950s-1970s)«, SDALC, 2013, 47: 41.
33 Cf. Speech to Bandung Conference Political Committee, 
1955 by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru http://lega-
cy.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1955nehru-bandung2.html (ac-
cessed 24 January 2015, reprinted in George M. Kahin, The 
Asian-African Conference, Ithaca, NY, 1956, 64-72).
34 See on British-Indian youth movements and their over-
arching paramilitary nature also Franziska Roy, »The Torch-
bearers of Progress: Youth, Volunteer Organisations and 
National Discipline in India, c. 1918-1947« (PhD, Warwick Uni-
versity, 2013).
ternational Union of Students). Others were spon-
sored by agents in the Western Bloc including the 
CIA and British IRD in conjunction with MI5 (like 
the World Assembly of Youth and its various affili-
ates). By tracing cultural actors below the official 
state level who navigated the binary global order, 
this work complicates the paradigm of non-align-
ment and cultural front politics in the post-colonial. 
The contention here is that by looking at the few 
available official documents from the postcolonial 
states and delving into the cultural side of the Cold 
War, much can be learnt about the complicated 
semi-political alliances forged during the era that 
are beyond the purview of International Relations 
Studies. Diplomacy via cultural networks should, 
however, not be underestimated. These contacts, 
and flows of money from private foundations act-
ing on behalf of intelligence and state actors (fa-
mously, the Rockefeller and Ford foundations), add 
an important dimension to our understanding of the 
overall international dynamic of the period. 
The shift from nationalist struggle to state-build-
ing and different geopolitical concerns changed no-
tions of what makes for ideal citizens and the char-
acteristics required of them (as far as the state, as 
well as actors within civil society were concerned) 
changed, too. Many ideals regarding the soldier-
citizen and a required technique of the self (such as 
striving for selflessness and self-perfection) were, 
however, carried into the post-colonial era. The end 
of the Cold War, and the subsequent expansion of 
the capitalist market, together with the crumbling 
of the grand narrative of modernity, brought to the 
fore other configurations of contingency and mo-
dalities for taming it. In many ways, looking at con-
tingency and related concepts elucidates the sharp 
paradoxes of the post-Cold War period. Research in 
Africa, the site of the three remaining case studies, 
illustrates this. 
Since the 1990s, a simultaneous shuttering and 
opening of the horizons of expectations has oc-
curred in Africa. On the one hand, contingency in 
the form of economic insecurity and political in-
stability has been a haunting presence in African 
lives. On the other, Africans have been concurrent-
ly exposed to a wider horizon of life possibilities, 
modernities and avenues to wealth which, in line 
with a culture of neoliberalism, place emphasis 
on a positive engagement with uncertain realities 
through speculative investment, the enterpris-
ing self and an active engagement with chance.35 
While expectations of modernity, especially in the 
form of development, still pervade African ideas of 
35 Jean Comaroff, and John L. Comaroff,  »Millennial Capi-
talism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming«, in Jean Coma-
roff and John L. Comaroff (eds.), Millennial Capitalism and 
the Culture of Neoliberalism, Durham, 2001, 1-56.
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progress,36 a widespread sense of the open-ended, 
unpredictable nature of the future has therefore 
yielded other ideas of progress, as well.
Neoliberal reforms and ensuing economic un-
certainty have made livelihoods a poignantly con-
tingent endeavour for numerous ordinary Afri-
cans, particularly for the many young people stuck 
in »waithood«, in the transition between youth and 
adulthood.37 Nevertheless, youth in Africa are not 
just passively waiting for their lives to change, but 
they pursue different strategies to prevail in the 
face of adversity. Daniel Mains’ anthro pological 
study of unemployed youth in urban Ethiopia dis-
cusses the consequences of the seemingly unat-
tainable aspirations of young males. He highlights 
the contradictory situation of a generation that 
has improved access to education and informa-
tion – hallmarks of modernisation – but still finds 
it hard to make »progress« in their social lives. 
Despite evoking the idea that young men’s »hope 
is cut«, Mains shows how they apply different ap-
proaches to achieve progress on an individual lev-
el, understood here as »improvement over time«. 
These strategies can include seeking support in 
»reciprocal« relations of friendship or a »spatial 
fix to a temporal problem«, i.e. pursuing or imag-
ining a future outside Ethiopia.38 Indeed, in many 
parts of Africa taming uncertainty has resulted 
in narratives of progress and success that are in-
creasingly linked to a »global horizon« of migrant 
destinations. 
If, in some cases, the failure of given trajecto-
ries of progress and the experience of uncertainty 
have re-directed expectations elsewhere, in other 
cases the very same trajectories have been re-
formed in order to create new possible futures. 
Still concerning Ethiopia, Julian Tadesse’s study of 
entrepreneurship programmes is an example of a 
government trying to manage heightened expecta-
tions regarding the future, which have been cre-
ated by an expanding educational system but are 
at the same time threatened by the inability of the 
labour market to absorb the increasing number of 
university graduates. Progress in this context ap-
pears to be closely linked to concrete visions of a 
more prosperous future, spelled out in the govern-
ment’s Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), 
which aims to elevate the country to a middle-in-
come status. The GTP, like other plans of this type, 
36 James Ferguson, Expectations of Modernity: Myths and 
Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt. Berke-
ley, 1999.
37 Alcinda Honwana, »›Waithood‹: Youth transitions and 
social change«, in Dick Foeken, Ton Dietz, Leo de Haan and 
Linda Johnson (eds.), Development and Equity: An Interdis-
ciplinary Exploration by Ten Scholars from Africa, Asia and 
Latin America, Leiden, 2014, 19-27. 
38 Daniel Mains, Hope is Cut: Youth, Unemployment, and 
the Future in Urban Ethiopia. Global Youth. Philadelphia, 
2011, 4.
is managed in a top-down, authoritarian mode and 
projects a vision of linear development to which 
there is no alternative. Nevertheless, uncertainty 
persists, and attempts to shape the future and 
eliminate contingency have a tendency to produce 
the opposite effect, too. A case in point is the con-
nection between the expansion of the education 
system to produce a future vanguard in Ethiopia 
and youth unemployment described in more detail 
below. Unemployed graduates become a liability 
for the legitimacy of the development project. For 
one, the state agenda promises economic benefits 
and continuous growth for society as a whole. On 
the other, university graduates are projected as 
model citizens and human capital who are exhort-
ed to »unleash« their »full potential« for the sake 
of Progress. Thus, unemployed graduates pose a 
paradox to the narrative of developmentalism. 
To elaborate on this point, providing some de-
tails will be necessary: Youth have been one fo-
cal point of attention in the developmental agenda. 
Evidence can be found in the massive expansion 
of the Ethiopian education system from the end of 
the 1990s onward, and, in more explicit forms, of 
mobilisation through youth organisations and gov-
ernment development programmes. However, the 
outcome of such efforts does not always conform 
to the government’s desired results and expecta-
tions. An example of such inherent contingencies 
is the case of the expansion of the educational sec-
tor, which exhibits a mismatch of graduates’ skills 
and industry needs, as well as the inability of the 
labour market to absorb the growing number of 
graduates. In order to manage the unanticipated 
consequences of educational expansion, gradu-
ates are encouraged to start their own entrepre-
neurial ventures. Thus, »Entrepreneurship« has 
become a buzzword that is framed as the answer 
to youth unemployment. Donor-funded training 
programmes have been established to equip the 
target group with the necessary skills and to facil-
itate entrepreneurship. Fundamentally, however, 
their goal is to bring about a »mind-shift« that will 
turn »job-seekers into job-creators« (as a govern-
ment official proclaimed at the launch of one such 
programme). These training programmes could 
well be seen as part of a »contingency plan« to 
ease pressure on the government to provide jobs. 
In fact, here the burden is reversed, that is, young 
graduates are expected to create jobs for others. 
Moreover, by emphasising the necessity of an atti-
tudinal change in the target group, a structural 
problem is transformed into a question of individ-
ual mentality. What is more, by their very nature, 
these programmes do not serve simply to reduce 
insecurity and unemployment, but also to prepare 
youth to participate and succeed in a globalised 
economy. That is to say, they envision, in a typi-
cal neoliberal fashion, the global market as the re-
pository of progress. Since notions of risk and risk 
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management are central to contemporary forms of 
flexible accumulation, this sanctions a radical re-
orientation of attitudes towards contingency.
This leads us to explore the other side of the 
coin of the current period, namely new horizons of 
possibility and the positive evaluation of indeter-
minacy in addressing highly contingent lives. The 
anthropologist Charles Piot shows that trading 
the past for an uncertain future has been a promi-
nent development in West Africa since the fall of 
the Berlin Wall.39 A number of social movements 
have proliferated which portray the past and »tra-
dition« as irrelevant or unsuitable to progress in 
life. Rather, they exhort West Africans to be open 
to the possibilities of the present and the future. 
Amongst the most readily available examples of 
this are religious movements such as Pentecostal 
Christianity and reformist Islam, both of which ad-
vocate in different ways for a radical »break with 
the past«.40 Abdoulaye Sounaye’s study of Islamic 
preaching practices among youth in Niger asks if 
the Sunnance, reformist Muslims promoting the 
tradition of the Prophet Muhammad, are the result 
of an »unexpected development« of the Izala re-
form movement insofar as their preaching is even 
becoming anti-Izala. In embracing Islamic reform, 
young Sunnance have found the resources and op-
portunities to break away from particular tempo-
ralities, to escape destined futures and to create 
the conditions for an alternative social project.
In this context, religion and religiosity offer new 
opportunities (economic, social, political) while 
expanding the horizon of possibilities. Sunnance 
youth champion a project that is based on refash-
ioning the self and reconstructing their community. 
Taking inspiration from models and norms they 
find in the Islamic tradition and using preaching, 
a key platform of their intervention in the public 
arena, they popularise religious ideas and social 
practices, which are gradually transforming urban 
religiosity and life conditions. In this way, they are 
not just passive recipients of the state’s version of 
history and the plans society has for them; they 
break free and escape from many forms of social 
control as they question, challenge and even rein-
vent the conduct required of them. Illustrating a 
form of Muslim modernity41, within the confines of 
their religious communities, between social struc-
tures and their imagined futures, the Sunnance 
redraw the normative and political lines that de-
marcate generations while they create alternative 
conditions for moral progress and setting their 
39 Charles Piot, Nostalgia for the Future: West Africa after 
the Cold War, Chicago, 2010.
40 Among others: Marloes Janson, Islam, Youth and Moder-
nity in the Gambia: The Tablighi Jama’at, Cambridge, 2013.
41 Ousmane Kane, Muslim Modernity in Postcolonial Ni-
geria: A Study of the Society for the Removal and Reinstate-
ment of Tradition, Boston, 2003.
own futures free. In their attempts to avoid bid’a 
(unlawful innovations) by following in the footsteps 
of the Prophet Muhammad, they seek authenticity, 
correct modes of behavior and a moral tune-up to 
protect against this Things-Falling-Apart era. The 
moral activism, media practices and sociabilities 
that develop around preaching among the Sun-
nance open a window to prospects for domesticat-
ing the contingent, regaining control over individ-
ual life trajectories and consequently redressing 
the course of history. While rejecting life paths 
brought into existence by social spaces and prac-
tices, engaging with the Sunna opens possibilities 
for youth to enjoy mobility and social becoming.42 
It also provides these possibilities to other social 
categories. Thus, unsatisfied with what they are 
offered, Sunnance youth retool it, deploy it and use 
it to attempt to domesticate what may seem be-
yond their control. In that sense, Sunnance youth 
are not necessarily off-siders, mere recipients of 
norms produced and maintained for them, but 
builders and shifters who rely on religion to bri-
colage their lives–all while navigating the tensions 
that emerge at the intersection of their aspira-
tions, their social conditions and their implemen-
tation of an Islamic revival agenda.
That taming contingency does not necessar-
ily involve constraining and managing is evident 
in the proliferation of practices that, in Africa as 
elsewhere, embrace the forces of contingency in 
form of gambling, lotteries, occult practices, etc. 
However, while these phenomena certainly reflect 
the neoliberal predicament of an explorative, per-
petually reinventing self,43 they also build on a 
long-standing engagement with indeterminacy. In 
Africa, these include various techniques of divina-
tion and witchcraft that probe causal forces inher-
ently thought to lie beyond human control.44 Paolo 
Gaibazzi shows that these engagements do not nec-
essarily fall under a management approach to con-
tingency. His work deals with Soninke men in the 
Gambia who have developed an attitude marked by 
openness and the embracing of indeterminacy45. In 
this setting, the prevalent model for personal and 
collective progress can be described as the »big 
man« kind, whereby men are supposed to strive 
42 Catrine Christiansen, Mats Utas and Henrik E. Vigh 
(eds.), Navigating Youth, Generating Adulthood: Social Be-
coming in an African Context, Uppsala, 2006, and Piotr Sz-
tompka, Society in Action: The Theory of Social Becoming, 
Chicago, 1991.
43 Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, »Occult Econo-
mies and the Violence of Abstraction: Notes from the South 
African Postcolony«, American Ethnologist 26:2 (1999), 279-
303.
44 Knut Graw, »Locating Nganiyo: Divination as Intentio-
nal Space«, Journal of Religion in Africa 36:1 (2006), 78-119
45 Cf. Marco Di Nunzio, »Embracing Uncertainty: Young 
People on the Move in Addis Ababa’s Inner City«, in Cooper 
and Pratten, Ethnographies, 2015.
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for wealth in order to support and enlarge their 
families and their clienteles. This is not an atavis-
tic, static model, but one influenced by, and repro-
duced in, other narratives of progress, primarily 
that of socioeconomic development. Communities 
thus expect their »big men« to contribute to com-
munity development along with other actors such 
as NGOs and the state. For generations, aspira-
tions of economic accumulation have been linked 
to international circuits of labour and trade mi-
gration, which have scattered Soninke travellers 
to diverse destinations worldwide. Central to the 
economy and culture of migration is that travel-
ling often involves unexpected detours in the pur-
suit of economic opportunities and to avert perils 
and unpredictable impasses. Rather than simply 
being considered as insecurity, however, the un-
certainty of travel is also thought to be auspicious, 
for it potentially brokers new routes to fortune. 
Soninke men capture the contingent unfolding of 
their trajectories toward success by making ref-
erence to »luck«. This is not necessarily a chance 
event, but rather an element of Islamic destiny. 
Whilst this is bestowed by God at unknown times 
and in unknown forms, men must also proactively 
search for »luck«. According to Gaibazzi, there is 
no distinct set of skills for dealing with the contin-
gent nature of »luck« other than a cultivated dis-
position of receptiveness and serendipity toward 
the open-ended nature of migratory life. This dis-
position is paradoxically sustained by an ethic of 
hard work, self-discipline and endurance inculcat-
ed in rural men from a young age. Hard work does 
not simply lead to accumulation and prosperity (in 
a deterministic fashion), but also fosters an abil-
ity to adapt and to remain alert to the unpredict-
able twists and turns during the search for »luck«. 
Therefore, even though in this socio-cultural con-
text, contingency may appear as being untamed, it 
still crystallises into a certain normative view of 
life and masculinity. 
Concluding thoughts
At this point we would like to briefly return to the 
aim of our group: to identify conceptual loci and 
modes which allow our projects to communicate 
in a comparative way. The nexus of experience, 
expectation and contingency works with catego-
ries that are not only abstract enough to allow 
for comparison, but are also relevant for both an-
thropological and historical conceptual thinking. 
It goes without saying that every individual case 
has to be studied with the question »Why at this 
very moment in this very place by this very actor?« 
When we examine earlier periods, say the 20th 
century, we might make out patterns in the way 
people tended to deal with contingency in a time 
and place in which the latter might be perceived as 
troubling and requiring management. This would 
mean that comparisons between mainstream at-
titudes towards contingency and everyday prac-
tices relating to it in different periods and con-
texts might elucidate what factors go into shaping 
these attitudes. In the case of contemporary East 
and West Africa, economic deprivation, an educa-
tion sector not well aligned with the economy or 
people’s needs, as well as a rhetoric of self-making 
by embracing uncertain futures, might be relevant 
factors, whereas in times of economic prosperity 
and anticipated development, an orientation of the 
»haves« toward contingency management or elimi-
nation might make sense. Major shifts in political 
economic systems or world views might also spur 
a perceived need to re-order the world and to re-
orient oneself within it. 
